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The paper discusses the respective roles of competition policy and sector-specific regulation for 
industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and gas, in which network infrastructures that 
are natural monopolies serve as essential facilities for anybody who wants to provide services in 
downstream markets. Whereas, in the past, such industries tended to be organized as state-owned 
or state-regulated vertically integrated monopolies, after a fundamental change of paradigm, ap-
propriate governance nowadays is considered to involve downstream competition supported by a 
state-mandated access provision to the monopoly infrastructures. Following a brief sketch of the 
paradigm change, the paper enters into a systematic discussion of (i) the comparative advantages 
and disadvantages of the two policy regimes in enforcing access provision, (ii) the appropriate 
framework for drawing the line between regulated and unregulated parts of the industry, and (iii) 
a set of issues that arise when competition policy and to sector-specific regulation apply to a 
given industry at the same time. The discussion refers to (i)  the German experience before 2005 
when competition policy was used to regulate access in the energy sector, (ii) the European Di-
rectives of 2002, which rely on the concepts of “market” and “significant market power” to de-
termine which parts of the industry should be subject to regulation, and (iii) the recent cases in 
the telecommunications and postal sectors in which European competition law was used to  pro-
scribe behaviour that had been accepted by national regulators.  
Key Words: Network Industries, Competition Policy, Sector-Specific Regulation 
JEL Classification: K21, K23, L 40, L50  
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1. Introduction 
This paper discusses the respective roles of sector-specific regulation and competition policy in 
network industries. The term “network industries” refers to industries like telecommunications, 
electricity, gas, and rail transportation that involve important elements of a natural monopoly 
because the provision of services to customers presupposes the use of a fixed network infrastruc-
ture the costs of which are largely sunk.
2 If one wanted to be more precise, one would have to go 
into details of the scale economies and sunk costs in these infrastructure technologies. For in-
stance, one might ask whether the postal sector is a network industry: Whereas there are signifi-
cant scale effects in mail distribution, the main input here is labour; the costs of this input are not 
sunk, but involve significant learning-by-doing effects, which can foreclose competition in ways 
that are very similar to the foreclosure effects of sunk costs. In the analysis here, however, such 
details will be neglected. While acknowledging that the different network industries differ from 
each other in important and relevant ways, I will focus on questions that are common to all of 
them. 
Over the past three decades, the organization of network industries in Europe and the United 
States has undergone significant changes.
3 In the past, these industries had mostly been organ-
ized as vertically integrated monopolies. Management of the network and provision of services 
through the network were usually handled by the same institution. Natural monopolies in net-
works supported monopolies in services, in some instances by statutory regulation, in others by 
market foreclosure based on vertical integration. In Europe, most of the vertically integrated mo-
nopolies were held in state ownership, in the United States, most of them were in private owner-
ship subject to sector-specific regulation. Prices charged to final customers were usually com-
puted on some kind of cost-plus basis.
4  
By now, these industries have been thoroughly reorganized. The vertically integrated monopolies 
have come under strong pressure; in some cases, they have completely disappeared. The changes 
differ from industry to industry and from country to country, but a few common elements can be 
named. Developments have involved the privatization of companies that used to be in state own-
ership, the liberalization of entry into the provision of services on the basis of the networks, fi-
nally, also some vertical disintegration between the operation of the network and the provision 
of services.  
The liberalization of entry into the provision of services has been accompanied by the introduc-
tion of statutory rules requiring network operators to open their networks at regulated prices to 
competing service providers. It would therefore be misleading to merely refer to the change as 
“deregulation”, as is sometimes done in invocations of the holy triad of “privatization, liberaliza-
tion, and deregulation”. Whereas some regulations have been lifted, others have been newly im-
posed – the overall system of governance for network industries is simply different. 
                                        
2   For a discussion of how precisely to define the notion of natural monopoly, see Baumol et al. (1982]. 
3   For overviews, see Newbery (2000), OECD (2001). 
4  For an account of past approaches, see Viscusi et al. (2001). 3 
1.1  Paradigm Changes for Network Industries 
These developments have partly been driven by a change of paradigm for the governance of 
these industries. The vision of network industries run by vertically integrated monopolies has 
been replaced by a more complicated vision that involves monopolies upstream, in the organiza-
tion and management of networks, and competition downstream, in the provision of services 
through the networks. The new vision is based on the recognition that natural-monopoly ele-
ments of the industry extend less far than had previously been thought. Whereas the networks 
themselves are natural monopolies in the technical sense of the word, the same cannot be said of 
the downstream activities that are based on the networks.  
Characteristic examples are found in the telecommunications and electricity industries. In tele-
communications, the local loop of the fixed-line network involves significant fixed costs. Be-
cause of these costs, a reduplication of the local loop would be highly wasteful; because these 
costs are sunk before any sales occur, they warrant the classification of the “last mile” as a natu-
ral monopoly. In contrast, the provision of telecommunications services through the network 
does not warrant this classification. The technology here exhibits hardly any scale economies 
and hardly any sunk costs. If access to the network can be guaranteed, there is nothing to prevent 
the functioning of competitive markets. Even for fixed lines, at a high level of the network hier-
archy, i.e., for long-distance lines, one observes that, although costs are sunk, at relevant levels 
of use, duplication of long-distance lines is economical, and competition can be viable. Thus in 
Germany, there are by now more than a dozen companies that have their own long-distance net-
works as a basis for competing in long-distance service provision. Investment in these networks 
has been very active, extending remarkably far down the overall network hierarchy.
 5   
In the electricity industry, transmission and distribution grids are natural monopolies. For a 
transmission grid, there can be only one system operator in charge of maintaining a constant 
level of tension. For distribution grids, the inefficiency involved in duplicating the last mile 
would be even greater than in telecommunications. In contrast, the production of electricity, its 
transportation through the transmission and distribution grids, and its sale to final users exhibit 
no technical features that would warrant their classification as natural monopolies.  
Another paradigm change concerns the role of the networks themselves. In the telecommunica-
tions industry, the natural-monopoly features of the traditional fixed-line networks seem to be 
losing in importance as technical progress facilitates the development of alternative networks as 
a basis for service provision. Network monopolies are being replaced by systems of networks 
that are in competition with each other. The paradigmatic example is provided by mobile tele-
communications where, in any given country, we see a handful of operators building up net-
works and acquiring customers in competition with each other. We also see competition between 
fixed-line and mobile telecommunications, or between fixed-line and cable networks. Telecom-
munications services through different kinds of networks may not be perfect substitutes, but, 
                                        
5   For details, see Monopolkommission (2002, 2004a, 2006) 4 
even so, the imperfect substitutes that are available can impose effective constraints on the be-
haviours of the presumed network monopolists.
6 If so, we should be thinking about the industry 
as being in oligopolistic competition between network providers, rather than network monopo-
lists holding sway over facilities that are essential to the provision of services downstream. 
1.2  Changes of Public Policy towards Network Industries 
The change in paradigm concerning the nature and implications of natural monopolies in net-
work industries has also led to a change of public policy towards these industries. The change 
has been marked by (i) a tendency to privatize previously state-owned companies in network 
industries, (ii) the opening of network industries to competition, and (iii) a reorientation of regu-
latory oversight, away from the direct control of final output prices and towards the promotion of 
competition in the industry.  
These changes in public policy were to some extent motivated by the observation that the verti-
cally integrated state-owned monopolists of the past had been slow in making use of new techno-
logical opportunities and that this was endangering the competitiveness of firms relying on ser-
vices from these infrastructure industries.
7 To some extent, they were also promoted by finance 
ministers hoping to benefit from privatization proceeds or simple the cost reductions of downsiz-
ing under the threat of competition.
8 Given that competition tends to erode profits, there is an 
inherent conflict between these two aims, but, as long as it was just a matter of reform rhetoric, 
the conflict was played down. In political practice though, this conflict has been and continues to 
be quite important.  
Within the European Union, the European Commission has been a major promoter of change. 
Under the auspices of the Internal Market Programme, it has initiated a series of directives de-
signed to eliminate statutory monopolies in the different network industries and to create EU-
wide internal markets, at least at the level of downstream activities, which are not natural mo-
nopolies in themselves and merely use the network infrastructures as essential inputs.
9 These 
                                        
6   As of 2001, a study commissioned by the German Monopolies Commission showed that mobile networks 
imposed hardly any competitive pressure on fixed-line networks; the study also suggested that, for large-
scale data communication, substitutability would never be perfect (Monopolkommission 2002, par. 88 – 98). 
Beginning in 2005, relations between mobile and fixed-line telecommunications markets have drastically 
changed so that, by now, the wholesale loss of customers to mobile networks is a major worry of the fixed-
line incumbent (Monopolkommission 2006, par. 60 – 67). 
7   Thus, Deutsche Bundespost in the nineteen-eighties was still insisting that anything but a wire-attached grey 
phone with a traditional dial would pose a risk to the safety of its network – at a time when wireless touch-
tone phones were becoming the norm in the rest of the world.  
8   Whereas the state-owned Deutsche Bundespost had been a perennial loss-maker, with losses in the mail sys-
tem exceeding profits from telecommunications by far, today, after the separation from telecommunications 
and after privatization, the traditional mail activities of Deutsche Post are highly profitable, with profits-to-
sales ratios in the letters segment lying significantly above ten percent in each of the past ten years.  
9   References to directives are given at the end of the paper. 5 
directives have been instrumental in imposing change on national legislation in the different 
member states.
10  
Whereas, in the past, the main objective of government oversight over network industries had 
been to restrain the use of market power to charge high prices for their outputs, under the new 
paradigm, regulatory control of final-output prices has moved into the background. The main 
task of regulatory institutions for network industries today is to promote the development of 
competition in these industries, namely competition in downstream markets and competition be-
tween networks where this is possible.  
Competition in downstream markets is promoted by access regulation requiring the owner of the 
network to provide downstream service providers with the opportunity to use the network at 
whatever conditions are deemed to be reasonable. Thus the owner of the local loop in fixed-line 
telecommunications is mandated to provide interconnection to competing providers of long-
distance services or even local services. He may even be mandated to provide a competitor with 
access to the copper wire leading into a customer’s house so that the latter, rather than the in-
cumbent himself, can provide the customer with basic service.  
For the promotion of network competition, the role of access regulation is somewhat ambivalent: 
On the one hand, access regulation reduces barriers to entry by allowing competitors to enter the 
fray with some investment without having to duplicate the entire network of the incumbent mo-
nopolist. On the other hand, access regulation reduces incentives to build competing infrastruc-
tures. There is thus a tension between the promotion of competition in downstream activities 
through access regulation upstream and the promotion of competition in upstream activities 
themselves. To be sure, the promotion of competition upstream will also serve the promotion of 
competition downstream, if only because the competing infrastructures upstream provide a basis 
for downstream competition. However, the effects are likely to take longer than the effects of 
access regulation permitting downstream entry without upstream investments. 
With all this enthusiasm about the promotion of competition, we still should note that, in the ab-
sence of competition among networks, there still is a problem of monopoly power to worry 
about. If the owner of an electricity distribution grid ceases all electricity generation on his own 
account and merely sells the transmission through his grid to outside generators, final customers 
have a choice between electricity generators, but this competition between generators does not 
reduce the grid owner’s monopoly power. Thus the traditional task of sector-specific regulation, 
                                        
10   Having the network industries come into the domain of European integration has vastly expanded the Com-
mission’s domain of activity. Sometimes the Commission gives the impression that it treats the factual, as 
opposed to legal, integration of markets as a policy objective in its own right, on a par with the objectives of 
competition policy.  Thus, the Commission’s DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry of 10 Janu-
ary 2007 has subheadings “Concentration”, “Vertical Foreclosure”, “Market Integration”, “Transparency”, 
“Price Issues”, without any acknowledgement of the fact that market integration as such is a political aim that 
may have little to do with competition and with economic performance. The Commission’s attitude to the 
proposed takeover of the Spanish energy provider Endesa by the German company E.ON, like its 2000 deci-
sion in the VEBA/VIAG merger case, gives the impression that, when a proposed merger holds a prospect of 
promoting market integration at the expense of competition, the competition concerns take second place.  6 
namely to restrain the use of power of network monopolists without endangering the viability of 
the networks, has not become obsolete. 
1.3  Sector-Specific Regulation versus Competition Policy: the Issues  
The changes that have occurred raise questions about the appropriate statutory and institutional 
framework for regulatory oversight of the network industries. Under the ancient régime, regula-
tory oversight involved direct interventions designed to protect customers in final-output mar-
kets. This was the maintained purpose of statutory oversight over output prices under sector-
specific regulation in the United States, as well as the various forms of government involvement 
in Europe. Under the new paradigm, competition itself is deemed to be the major force for cus-
tomer protection. The notion that competition is the major force for customer protection is of 
course at the heart of traditional competition policy. One may therefore ask what is, or what 
should be, the relation between statutory oversight over the network industries and traditional 
competition policy.  
At a very basic level, the question is whether anything more than traditional competition policy 
is needed. If we believe that customers end up being protected by competition itself, is it not 
enough to foster competition and, for this purpose, rely on the well-known tools of competition 
policy, antitrust policy and merger control? Couldn’t we simply use the prohibition of exclusion-
ary abuses under antitrust law in order to make sure that competitors in downstream markets are 
given access to upstream infrastructures? Or, to put the question differently, what are the com-
parative advantages and disadvantages of traditional competition policy as opposed to sector-
specific regulation in dealing with the problem of natural monopoly in network infrastructures? 
Further questions arise when a given industry is subject to sector-specific regulation and compe-
tition policy at the same time. There are two reasons why this can happen. First, different activi-
ties and different markets may be subject to different forms of statutory oversight. If we believe 
that the network infrastructure is a monopoly whose power needs to be effectively constrained 
and the downstream market is intensely competitive, we may want to subject the former to sec-
tor-specific regulation while leaving the latter to competition policy. In this case, the question is 
how one can ensure that public policy towards the industry as a whole is consistent. This is 
partly a legal question, concerning the consistency of norm interpretation across regimes, and 
partly an institutional question, concerning relations between the different institutions that are 
charged with the different forms of oversight.  
Second, in the European Union, the same activities are sometimes subject to antitrust law and 
sector-specific regulation at the same time. This is due to the peculiar interaction of European 
Law and national law in the European Union. Sector-specific regulation, though narrowly cir-
cumscribed by European directives, is a matter of national law. At the level of national law, the 
existence of sector-specific regulation under a sector-specific law tends to preclude the applica-
tion of general antitrust law. However, national laws cannot override the Treaty. Therefore, na-7 
tional laws concerning sector-specific regulation cannot preclude the application of Articles 81 
and 82 EC to the very activities that are the subject of sector-specific regulation.
11  
An example is provided by the Commission’s assessing a fine of some 12 million euros against 
Deutsche Telekom on the grounds that the price which final consumers were charged for basic 
service on analogue lines was predatory, being hardly above, for some time even below, the 
(regulated) price that Deutsche Telekom was charging for access to the bare wire that a competi-
tor would need to provide such service himself.
12 The very same price that the Commission 
treated as an exclusionary abuse under Article 82 EC had previously been approved by the Ger-
man Regulatory Authority.  
In such cases, where regulation and antitrust policy concern the same activities, the problem of 
consistency of public policy comes up with a vengeance. There also is an issue of competition 
between European and national, antitrust and regulatory authorities.
13 In the Deutsche Telekom 
case, the European Commission argued that it was not actually contesting the Regulatory Au-
thority’s decision. If it had done so, it would have had to initiate Treaty infringement proceed-
ings against Germany. 
 To avoid this roundabout and lengthy way of dealing with the matter, the 
Commission observed that one of the prices that were considered to be abusive belonged to a 
basket of prices under a price-cap regime and argued that it was not contesting the price cap that 
the Regulatory Authority had imposed, but only the use that Deutsche Telekom had made of the 
leeway it had in setting individual prices under this price-cap.
14 In fact, however, the Commis-
sion was overriding the Regulatory Authority’s decision not to apply the prohibition of predatory 
pricing which existed under the German telecommunications law as under Article 82 EC.
15  
One might think that such instances of one institution overriding another are natural occurrences 
in a system involving a legal appeals process. However, this is not what we are seeing. Whereas 
a legal appeals process would have a single hierarchy of legal institutions consider the proper 
application of a single law to a given case, the coexistence of national sector-specific regulation 
and European antitrust law gives rise to two hierarchies of legal institutions applying two differ-
                                        
11   By contrast, the Trinko and Crédit Suisse decisions of the United States Supreme Court have made clear that, 
in the United States, the existence of sector-specific regulation rules out the application of the corresponding 
provisions of antitrust law.  
12   References to decisions in individual cases are given at the end of the paper.  
13   In this context, it is worth noting that, under Regulation 01/2003, European antitrust law can also be invoked 
by the national competition authority. Thus, in a more recent case involving Deutsche Post, the Federal Car-
tel Office proscribed an exclusionary abuse that the Regulatory Authority had refused to deal with. The Ger-
man Postal Law, under which the Regulatory Authority was acting, had a wider specification than the Postal 
Directive permitted of the domain where the incumbent retained his statutory monopoly. Whereas the Treaty 
infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission would have taken a few years, the Cartel 
Office’s intervention led to an immediate termination of the abuse.  
14   The Commission has used this line of argument again in the more recent Telefonica case. In April 2008, the 
Court of First Instance confirmed the validity of the argument in the Deutsche Telekom case.   
15    The Regulatory Authority asserted that, under the price-cap regime, the anti-exclusionary and anti-
discriminatory provisions of the law were to be applied to the basket, rather than the individual components 
of the basket. In fact, as was pointed out by the Federal Cartel Office as well as the Monopolies Commission, 
this assertion in fact was in conflict with the law, which stipulated a price-cap basket approach only for the 
anti-exploitative provisions of the law.  8 
ent laws to the same aspects of a given case. This is where the consistency problem comes in 
with a vengeance. 
These issues have a dynamic, as well as a static, dimension. Whereas the static dimension con-
cerns the regulation and the functioning of the industry at any one point in time, the dynamic 
dimension concerns the development of the industry and its regulation over time. There are good 
reasons for seeing network industries as being in a state of transition. Whereas, at the time of 
market opening, these industries have highly concentrated market structures in all activities, one 
should expect that, as time goes on, the industry becomes more competitive, at least in down-
stream markets. In some industries, one may even expect to see competition between different 
networks. Such developments may call for a reassignment of the tasks of sector-specific regula-
tion and of competition policy, taking some activities and some markets out of the domain of 
sector-specific regulation and putting them under the auspices of competition policy. The Euro-
pean Union’s framework for regulating the telecommunications industry under the Telecommu-
nications Directives of 2002 is actually based on this notion and calls for regular reviews of 
whether markets are sufficiently competitive for sector-specific regulation to be replaced by 
competition policy.  
The notion of replacing sector-specific regulation by competition policy raises, first of all, the 
same questions as before, namely, what are the comparative advantages of the two regimes and 
what characteristics of markets and activities suggest that one or the other is more suitable? Also, 
if there is just a partial transition from one regime to the other, how are relations between the 
regulated parts and the unregulated parts, between the sector-specific regulator and the competi-
tion authority going to work out? In addition, the process of regime change raises a question of 
procedure: How is one to determine which markets and activities belong to one domain or the 
other? Are such regime changes to be irrevocable, or should we allow for the possibility of a yo-
yo process, a market going from sector-specific regulation to a competition policy regime and 
back?  
In the following, I will try to assess these different sets of issues one after the other. I begin with 
an assessment of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the two policy regimes. Fol-
lowing that, I will discuss the dynamics of (partial) transition between a regime of sector-specific 
regulation and a competition policy regime. Finally, I will consider some of the issues that are 
raised by the possible coexistence of both regimes in the same industry. In much of the discus-
sion, I will draw on observations from Germany, partly because this is the case with which I am 
most familiar and partly because this case is particularly instructive: Germany was the one coun-
try in the European Union that initially tried to have the energy sector subjected to competition 
policy only, without sector-specific regulation. The experiment failed, and the failure contains a 
lesson for the general issue of how to assess the respective roles of competition policy and sec-
tor-specific regulation in network industries.  9 
2.  Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages of Competition  
Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation  
2.1  Art. 19, Section 4, Nr. 4 of the German Law Against Restraint of Competition 
To set the scene for a more systematic discussion, I can do no better than to cite the German Law 
Against Restraint of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB). Under 
Art. 19, Section 4, Nr. 4 of this law, introduced in 1998, it is an “abuse of dominance to deny 
access to a network or another essential infrastructure at an appropriate price to a downstream 
competitor without showing material reason for the denial.” This rule is based on the notion that 
access provision itself can be handled as a matter of competition policy. This notion underlay the 
German resistance to sector-specific regulation in the energy industry, which was only ended by 
the Energy Law of 2005, which implemented the European Directives of 2003. Promoters of the 
notion that access provision can be handled as a matter of competition policy pointed to the ex-
perience of the United States where the so-called  essential facilities doctrine was said to have 
been an integral part of competition policy since the Terminal Railroad case of 1912.
16 
The Federal Cartel Office’s experiences with this clause have been miserable. The main reason is 
that, in the present context, the notion of “appropriate price” does not lend itself to court pro-
ceedings in which the burden of proof lies with the cartel office. The legal rule requires the 
owner of the infrastructure to give proof as to why it would be unconscionable to require him to 
provide others with access; for everything else, including the assessment of the access price, the 
burden of proof is with the cartel office. As far as I know, every injunction that the Federal Car-
tel Office has issued under this provision of the law has been contested in court, and the Federal 
Cartel Office has lost every single case, at least in the first instance, at the Court of Appeal 
(Oberlandesgericht – OLG) in Düsseldorf, in whose jurisdiction the Federal Cartel office is lo-
cated. 
Typical responses of this court have been: 
•  Mandating the granting of access without indicating what the price should be runs counter to 
the principle that mandates from an administrative authority should be sufficiently specific 
for the addressees to know what they have to do.
17 
•  It is not enough to show that revenues on a distribution grid are significantly higher than the 
relevant measure of costs; the authority must indicate precisely which individual price it 
deems to be excessive.
18 
                                        
16   For a systematic discussion of the essential facilities doctrine and practice, see Lipsky and Sidak (1999), 
Gérardin and Sidak (2005). 
17   This Judgment of the OLG Düsseldorf in the case Fährhafen Puttgarden, which concerned access to the port 
of Puttgarden, was subsequently voided by the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH). The Fed-
eral Supreme Court suggested that, at least in a first go, it was reasonable to expect the parties in question to 
bargain about the access price. However, if the bargaining did not lead to a satisfactory conclusion, the Fed-
eral Cartel Office might be required to set (and justify) the access price yet. 10 
•  It is not enough to show that, in a cost-plus system of price determination, some cost compo-
nents are unduly inflated (like attribution of electricity marketing costs to the grid); the cartel 
office must also provide proof that no other cost components are understated so that the infla-
tion of some components is outweighed.
19 
2.2  What Can Competition Policy Do? 
The difficulties encountered by the Federal Cartel Office reflect the fact that the enforcement of 
access provision is not a suitable object for competition policy.
20 Competition policy consists, by 
and large, of a set of rules and measures which are designed to forbid certain types of behaviour. 
Competition policy is not designed to tell market participants what they should do. Cartel agree-
ments are forbidden. Abuses of dominance are forbidden. Mergers that create or strengthen a 
dominant position, or, under the new Regulation, mergers that create a significant impediment to 
effective competition are forbidden. In none of these legal provisions is there any notion that the 
competition authority should tell companies what to do. Sometimes, the competition authorities 
do so anyway, e.g., when they approve a merger subject to certain obligations on the parties in 
question.
21 However, these instances are taken to be the exception, sometimes even running 
counter to the very spirit of competition policy.   
The stance of competition policy as a regime of prohibitions is a source of strength as well as 
weakness. It is a source of strength because the competition authority does not have to evaluate 
alternative course of actions that it might mandate to the companies. It is therefore  not depend-
ent on the information that would be needed for such an evaluation. Even more importantly, the 
stance of competition policy as a system of prohibitions plays a major role in the submission of 
competition policy to a rule of law and its insulation from at least the most blatant pressures of 
political wilfulness. Evaluations of alternative mandates for positive course of actions would in-
volve significant elements of subjective judgement. They would hardly be adjudicable in a court 
of law – and would for that very reason provide a wonderful playground for interest politics.  
                                                                                                                           
18   This Judgment of the OLG Düsseldorf in the matter of grid pricing of Stadtwerke Mainz, a municipal elec-
tricity distributor, was also voided by the Federal Supreme Court, and the case was sent back to the OLG. 
However, even as it voided the lower court’s judgement, the Federal Supreme Court stressed the need to al-
low for a significant margin of error in assessing excessive pricing. On the case, see Monopolkommission 
(2005), par. 563 – 577 (par. 165* in the English Summary) 
19   This Judgment of the OLG Düsseldorf in the case of TEAG, a distribution company of E.ON, was not ap-
pealed. On the case, see Monopolkommission (2005), par. 558 – 562 ( par. 164* in the English Summary). 
20   The German Monopolies Commission argued this point even before the Federal Cartel Office had tried to 
interfere with the electricity companies’ access pricing practices. Its 2002 report (Monopolkommission 2003, 
par. 726 – 869, 115* – 146* in the English Summary) provides a systematic treatment of the pros and cons of 
sector-specific regulation and competition policy for regulating network access and recommends a move to 
sector-specific regulation for the energy sectors. The discussion here follows the same line of argument. A 
similar treatment of these issues is provided by Newbery (2006). 
21   Thus, in the German energy mergers of 2000 (VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW), the European Commission and 
the Federal Cartel Office enjoined the companies to increase cross-border interconnector capacities and to 
award these capacities by auctions that would be open to competitors. The insignificance of the market open-
ing that was thereby achieved provides a serious warning against overconfidence in the effects of behavioural 
remedies.  11 
From this perspective, Art. 19, Section 4, Nr. 4 of the German Law Against Restraint of Compe-
tition is an abuse of language. A rule that forbids the denial of access is not really a prohibition. 
The objective of this rule is to induce the granting of access, i.e. to prescribe a specific behav-
iour. It is hardly possible to mandate this behaviour without addressing the question of what are 
to be the price and the quality of access. The rulings of the Düsseldorf court that I have cited in-
dicate some of the difficulties that this question poses for competition policy. Competition policy 
is not well placed to mandate a price and quality of access.  
The US experience with the so-called essential facilities doctrine confirms this assessment. The 
term “essential facilities doctrine” refers to a collection of court decisions, beginning with Ter-
minal Railroad in 1912. It is not clear whether this collection of court decisions amounts to a 
general principle along the lines of Art. 19, Section 4, Nr. 4 of the German Law Against Re-
straint of Competition.
22 What is clear, however, is that in all cases, the courts have refrained 
from determining the prices at which access had to be granted. They were able to do so because 
in some cases, it was enough to ask for prices to be non-discriminatory, i.e., to grant access to the 
plaintiff on the same terms as everybody else; in others, they referred the plaintiffs to an existing 
sector-specific regulator who could deal with the problem.
23 
In a regime of competition policy aiming at prohibitions of certain modes of behaviour, interven-
tions of the competition authority as well as the judicial review of such interventions tend to oc-
cur piecemeal, focussing on one or several actions in isolation, without regard to their overall 
significance in the system of governance of the network and the network industry. However, as I 
shall explain below, it is hardly possible to deal appropriately with access prices in isolation, 
without considering their systemic implications, be it for other access prices or for market condi-
tions downstream.  
Competition policy interventions occur not only piecemeal; they also occur ex post, after the dis-
puted behaviour has been implemented by the company and after the competition authority has 
had the time to obtain a grip on what is going on. Trying to get the requisite information is a 
daunting and time-consuming task of its own, the more so, because a network owner who wants 
to foreclose a downstream market has every incentive to delay the proceedings by withholding 
information and by exhausting all procedural possibilities that the legal system provides. As long 
as no final judgment has been pronounced, he can continue with the behaviour in question, pre-
sumably foreclosing the downstream markets to competition.  
In the case of the German electricity industry, the Federal Cartel Office had begun to investigate 
grid access pricing in 2001. It issued the first injunctions in 2003. The Court of Appeals refused 
to grant immediate enforcement and in fact overturned the injunctions in 2004. The Court of Ap-
peal’s decision in turn was overturned by the Federal Supreme Court  in 2005, which sent the 
matter back to the Court of Appeal. By this time, the matter had become moot because the sys-
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but, given the existence of sector-specific regulation, the matter did not need to be considered. 
23   Lipsky and Sidak (1999), Monopolkommission (2003, par. 746 – 753). 12 
tem of access provision under general competition policy had been replaced by a system of sec-
tor-specific regulation. Between 2001 and 2005, market structure had drastically changed be-
cause the large electricity providers had acquired more than two hundred participations in local 
and regional distributors, thereby assuring themselves of these distributors’ business and fore-
closing this business to outside generators. The willingness of local distributors to let themselves 
be taken into the folds of the large generators was partly motivated by a concern that high prices 
on transmission grids (including high prices for balancing energy, which were attributed to the 
grids) provided the large generators with significant margins so that they could threaten the local 
distributors’ business with industrial clients by offering electricity at prices close to or even be-
low short-run marginal costs.
24 
One could argue that competition policy might be more powerful if the position of the competi-
tion authority was strengthened. Thus one might consider giving the authority the right to sys-
tematically collect information, e.g., on costs on an ongoing basis. One might also consider 
strengthening the authority’s position in legal procedures, e.g., by changing the rules concerning 
the burden of proof. However, such changes would move the authority out of the traditional do-
main of competition policy and provide it with a kind of ongoing authority over the network in 
question, in short a kind of sector-specific regulation. Even though it might still be a competition 
authority for most of its activity, in practice, it would take on some roles of a sector-specific 
regulator. 
2.3  The Monopoly Problem in Network Industries   
As mentioned in the introduction, the traditional approach to statutory oversight of network mo-
nopolies had focused on customer protection through direct oversight of output prices and qual-
ity. The opening of downstream markets for competition provides hope that, at this level, such 
oversight can, at least eventually, be done away with.  
However, the paradigm change that has occurred should not lead to a belief that the “old” prob-
lem of controlling monopoly power has altogether disappeared. In those industries where net-
works serve as essential facilities for downstream activities, the monopoly problem has merely 
been shifted to the treatment of these facilities themselves. In part, this is a problem of enforcing 
access to make sure that control over the network is not used to foreclose downstream competi-
tion. Even if access is granted freely, on a non-discriminatory basis, access prices can be used to 
earn monopoly rents. They can also be used to foreclose competition. The German electricity 
industry provides examples for both, local distributors using their distribution grids as a source 
of monopoly profits and large generators using access fees for transmission grids to foreclose 
other generators competing for industrial clients.  
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To prevent such uses of monopoly power, it is not enough to impose legal unbundling of net-
work and to require access provision to be non-discriminatory. To be sure, with legal unbun-
dling, high access prices that are charged on a non-discriminatory basis hit the mother com-
pany’s downstream subsidiary just as they hit any competing company. However, from the per-
spective of the mother company, the access fee that the downstream subsidiary pays to the net-
work subsidiary is simply an internal transfer price that has no effect on the mother company’s 
aggregate profit.
25 The same high fee paid by a downstream competitor is a nice source of reve-
nues for the corporation and of costs for the competitor.
26 
At this point, it is useful to recall that the prevention of excessive prices is not one of the success 
stories of competition policy. In Europe, by contrast to the United States, excessive pricing is 
prohibited as an exploitative abuse under Article 82 EC (or under Art. 19, Section 4, Nr. 2 of the 
German Law Against Restraint of Competition). However, attempts to enforce this prohibition 
have by and large been unsuccessful. At the EU level, the Commission has only been successful 
in cases involving statutory monopolies; in United Brands, the European Court of Justice asked 
for evidence on the relation of prices and costs and imposed such a standard of proof that, subse-
quently, the Commission desisted from bringing such case. At the national level, in Germany, 
the Librium/Valium and Valium II cases of the seventies showed all the difficulties of assessing 
prices on the basis of price-cost comparisons when fixed-cost and common-cost components are 
large. In these drug cases, the court was unwilling to reject the companies’ defense that high 
margins above variable costs were needed to cover the costs of research, including research all 
the research attempts that fail. Given this past experience, the outcomes of the access pricing 
cases mentioned above could not really have come as a surprise.   
2.4  The Need for a Systemic Approach to Access Regulation 
Fixed and common costs are important for network infrastructures just as for medical drugs. 
Networks typically involve significant fixed and common costs. Moreover, they typically serve 
as infrastructure for multiple services. Cost attribution therefore is central to all decisions about 
                                        
25   The same argument applies to pricing for balancing energy. If the network subsidiary of an electricity com-
pany pays high prices for balancing energy and the balancing energy is produced by another subsidiary of the 
same company, the price for balancing energy is just an internal transfer price. According to an investigation 
of the Federal Cartel Office in 2003/2004,  for each of the four transmission grids, above 80 % of the balanc-
ing energy was supplied by a sister company of the grid operator; the difference between the price for balanc-
ing energy and the ordinary spot price was attributed to the grid and incorporated into grid transmission fees. 
Markets for balancing energy were, in principle competitive, but strict “prequalification requirements” im-
posed by the network operators made entry of outsiders all but impossible., see Monopolkommission (2005), 
par. 1196 – 1206 (par. 254* - 255* in the English summary). 
26   This problem would be eliminated or at least reduced if, as proposed by the European Commission, there was 
ownership unbundling, i.e. vertical disintegration, as well as legal unbundling. However, until now, owner-
ship unbundling has been politically infeasible in large parts of the European Union. Höffler and Kranz 
(2007) argue that ownership unbundling would come at a cost in terms of insufficient co-ordination of in-
vestments in generation and in transmission; they suggest that it might be sufficient to have legal unbundling 
with incentives of network managers tied to the profits of the network company, rather than the mother com-
pany.  
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network pricing. Thus, the problem of assessing access prices for these infrastructures is at least 
as difficult as the problem of assessing drug prices.  
The problem of cost attribution is inherently a systemic one. From management science and from 
economics, we know that there is no one method of attribution which can be considered to be 
unambiguously “appropriate”, be it as a management tool or as a criterion of welfare economics. 
From the perspective of welfare economics, some version of Ramsey pricing seems desirable, 
taking account of differences in demand elasticities in order to minimize the welfare impact of 
price distortions. However, in practice, Ramsey pricing is problematic because it requires a lot of 
information and is vulnerable to sabotage from the company in question. In practice, therefore, 
one tends to work with less informationally demanding, more robust procedures such as cost-
plus regulation, efficient-component pricing, price cap regulation with different baskets, or 
benchmarking regulation. The different approaches have different advantages and disadvantages, 
which can only be assessed in terms of their implications for the entire system regulated prices.
27 
Given that the problem of cost attribution is central to network pricing and given that this prob-
lem has no one “appropriate” solution, judicial review of any one individual price will hinge on 
who has authority to choose the cost attribution method. Under the competition policy tradition 
assigning the burden of proof to the cartel authority, the authority will find it all but impossible 
to prevent the use of access pricing as a device to foreclose competition in downstream markets.  
Even if one approach is accepted as unambiguously “appropriate”, within this approach, any one 
price will have to be assessed as part of a system of prices. To determine whether regulated 
prices permit the network owner to recover his costs or whether these prices provide proper in-
centives for network investments, it is not enough to look at a single price in isolation; one must 
consider the whole system of prices.  
Other aspects of access regulation also raise systemic concerns. At a very fundamental level, 
there is a tradeoff between the promotion of competition in downstream activities through access 
regulation upstream and the promotion of competition in upstream activities themselves. The 
stricter the access regulation is, the smaller are companies’ incentives to invest upstream on their 
own. Assessments of this tradeoff are likely to differ across industries, with more weight given to 
the promotion of upstream competition in telecommunications and less weight in the electricity 
sector.  
Further, for at least some industries, the picture of a well defined essential facility upstream and 
a well defined set of services downstream is misleading because it neglects the complexity of the 
vertical chain of value creation. In these industries, a key question concerns the definition of bot-
tlenecks to which access needs to be granted. In practice, this question of is not at all easy to an-
swer, and different answers tend to involve conflicting visions of where the industry is going. 
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As an example, consider interconnection-based network access versus pure resale models in tele-
communications. Interconnection means that access is granted only to a pre-defined part of the 
infrastructure and that the entrant has to invest into an own infrastructure (though that may be 
slim). With pure resale, the entrant could offer the service to customers by renting everything 
from the incumbent. A model of interconnection-based access is based on the notion that com-
petitive infrastructure investments are beneficial. A model of pure resale is based on the notion 
that competition in services is to be preferred, either because competitive infrastructure invest-
ments are unlikely to be forthcoming or because such investments involves duplication of exist-
ing infrastructures and are therefore wasteful.  
Thus, in the German discussion about the introduction of mandatory access regulation to permit 
resale, opposition has come not only from Deutsche Telekom, but also from those companies 
who had entered the market on the basis of the first model, getting access to the bare wire from 
Deutsche Telekom and providing basic service to customers. These companies see resale regula-
tion as a threat to their own investments. The important point is that, in this case, one model of 
competition in downstream markets is at odds with another. Whoever intervenes has to take a 
choice and should be aware of this.
 28   
2.5 Is  Sector-Specific  Regulation Preferable? 
Given the observation that access regulation requires a systemic approach and competition pol-
icy intervenes piecemeal, one might be tempted to see sector-specific regulation as the appropri-
ate answer to all the challenges that have been formulated in the preceding subsections. Sector-
specific regulation certainly is able to articulate an intervention policy in systemic terms. With a 
suitable basis in the underlying legal norms, it should also be able to overcome the procedural 
difficulties that arise in the framework of competition policy, e.g., determine basic principles for 
cost accounting and cost attribution, collect the requisite information on an ongoing basis, inter-
vene in a timely manner, with little delay from court proceedings.  
However, before one jumps to the conclusion that every network or other essential facility 
should be subject to sector-specific regulation, one should take a step back and reflect on possi-
ble drawbacks. Objections must be raised at three levels. First, it is not clear that a regulatory 
authority is as effective in practice as these theoretical reflections would seem to suggest. For 
instance, collecting information on an ongoing basis may be better than doing so ad hoc, when a 
problem is perceived, and one first has to fight before gets the information. However, even if the 
information is collected on an ongoing basis, the company in question may have plenty of scope 
to manipulate it. The regulatory authority may also have a hard time processing the information 
(especially if it is understaffed).  
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Second, experience suggests that sector-specific regulation is more likely to be captured than 
competition policy. The examples I gave in the introduction about the relation between Deutsche 
Telekom and Deutsche Post, the Regulatory Authority, and the competition authorities over the 
past decade probably have to do with the fact that the German government is a major shareholder 
in both companies, and, even though the Regulatory Authority is in the domain of the econom-
ics, rather than finance ministry, it is more subject to political pressure from the government than 
the Federal Cartel Office.  
There are two reasons for the difference. First, competition policy concerns all industries alike. 
In any one case, therefore, the competition authority can invoke equal-treatment arguments – 
and, one the force of these arguments, mobilize allies – to resist political pressure. Second, inter-
ventions of a sector-specific regulator cut to the core of the company’s business and are of cen-
tral importance to its profit line. With so much more at stake, the company itself has stronger 
incentives to try and mobilize pressure against the regulator. 
Third and perhaps most importantly, the very strength of sector-specific regulation is also its 
weakness. The ability to intervene and mandate a certain course of action involves the risk that 
this may just be the wrong thing to do. Where competition policy just prohibits companies from 
doing something, sector-specific regulation imposes a course of action upon them. A caricature 
of what this could mean was provided by the California electricity crisis in 2000 where the in-
compatibility between the development of market-determined wholesale prices upstream and 
regulated retail prices downstream caused the distributors to become insolvent and in the process 
imposed blackouts on households as well as firms.  
Whereas the deleterious effect of regulation in the California crisis was easy to recognize and 
should have been easy to correct, many issues are more subtle so that it is not easy to recognize 
and correct errors, let alone to do so in a timely fashion. What investment policies are the net-
work companies going to follow under sector-specific regulation? What cost of capital is the 
regulator assessing? How is risk taken into account in assessing capital costs? What about regu-
latory risk, e.g., the risk that, under a standard based on the costs of efficient service provision, 
technical change leads to a reduction of regulated access prices for a long-lived facility that does 
not yet embody tomorrow’s technology?  
For each of these questions, we may feel that, in a given case, the regulator should be able to 
come up with a reasonable answer. However, in thinking along such lines, we leave the para-
digm of the market system being wiser than any one participant or any one regulator. There may 
be good reasons for this; in some network industries, the monopoly problem may be important 
enough to warrant regulatory intervention. However, we need to be aware that this very interven-
tion blunts the market processes. The main justification for intervening anyway is probably that 
incumbent monopolists in such industries themselves do not leave much room for market proc-
esses, and that the imposition of access regulation upstream may induce some market dynamics 
downstream. However, this requires an assessment that the benefits of invigorating competition 
in downstream markets outweigh the costs of statutory intervention upstream. 17 
2.6 An  Example 
The electricity sector provides a case in point. The increases in electricity prices since 2005 have 
raised a lot of popular discontent. This discontent has fuelled activities of politicians and authori-
ties alike, from the European Commission’s Sector Enquiry and subsequent proposals for struc-
tural intervention to the German Government’s proposal to provide the Federal Cartel Office 
with increased powers to prosecute exploitative abuses in the energy sector. Yet, there is little 
empirical evidence that electricity pricing actually does involve an exploitative abuse, i.e., that 
the competition authorities’ inability to intervene is based on a lack of powers, rather than a lack 
of a case. An empirical study of London Economics (2007) for the European Commission has 
found that, in Germany in 2003 – 2005, wholesale electricity prices involved margins of some 27 
% above marginal costs (more precisely, the average variable costs of the marginal power plant). 
However, such a number is meaningless unless they are put into some relation to fixed costs.   
London Economics did provide a comparison to fixed costs, but the results of this comparison 
seem highly dependent on the specification they chose. They argued that investment in a new 
CCGT power plant with a generating capacity of 400 MW and a lifetime of fifteen years would 
be worthwhile if surpluses above variable costs came to some 67000 euros per year. Under mar-
ginal cost pricing, the four large suppliers in Germany would have earned some  76000 euros per 
MW of capacity on average per year in 2003 – 2005, some 13 % above the amount requires to 
provide for the hypothetical new power plant. Prices above marginal costs  could therefore be 
deemed to be excessive. 
However, this assessment depends on the rate of return on capital that is used. If instead of the 
rate of 6.5 % used by London Economics, one were to use a rate of 10 % or higher, as is com-
mon, e.g., in telecommunications regulation, the required surplus per year would rise from 67000 
to over 80000 euros, which would not have been covered under marginal cost pricing as assessed 
by London Economics.  
More importantly, I have doubts whether it makes sense to compare the surplus above variable 
costs that is required for an investment in the marginal power plant to be worthwhile with the 
average surplus above variable costs that is achieved on all power plants. The latter presumably 
is bloated by surpluses from water and nuclear energy, which have very low, sometimes even 
negative, variable costs, and rather higher fixed costs. For a proper assessment of the surpluses 
that were earned, one would need to assess investment costs for the entire portfolio of power 
plants. Implicitly, this also raises the question of what is an appropriate portfolio of power plants. 
At this point, however, we are in the middle of a systemic problem. The different types of power 
plants differ in the degree of flexibility with which they can be run up or down in response to 
foreseen and unforeseen changes in demand. Some power plants will always be running, others 
only at times of peak demand. Any assessment of the costs of the portfolio of power plants has to 
take these differences into account. Any such assessment also has to take into account that resid-
ual supply elasticities are lower, and market power is higher, at peak times when all available 18 
capacity is being used than at off-peak times when some excess capacity is available. Surpluses 
of revenues over variable costs are therefore easier to obtain at peak times than at off-peak times, 
and most likely the surpluses that are earned at peak times make an above-average contribution 
to covering capital costs, for the power plants that provide base-load electricity as well as the 
power plants that provide peak-load electricity.
29  
Given the systemic character of the problem, competition policy is not well-placed to establish 
whether electricity pricing is excessive or not. Most likely, the attempt by a competition author-
ity to establish an exploitative abuse will fail even if such an abuse is there. However, before one 
jumps to the conclusion that one needs sector-specific regulation in order to control electricity 
prices, one must take account of the risks inherent in such control. As indicated, the assessment 
of electricity prices is a delicate matter which can be highly sensitive to the details of the analysis 
that one undertakes. A regulatory authority is no more immune to error than a competition au-
thority; it only has more powers to impose its view of the matter through regulation. However, if 
it errs in the direction of restraining prices too much, this affects investment incentives. Given 
that environmental concerns and the coming exhaustion of important primary-energy sources call 
for innovations and new investments, the costs of such errors can be quite substantial. It may 
therefore be preferable to leave the generation and the sale of electricity in the domain of compe-
tition policy, rather than subjecting them to sector-specific regulation; the weakening of present-
day consumer protection that is thereby entailed is probably less important than the risk of blunt-
ing innovation and investment incentives in electricity production. 
The very same concern also calls for ensuring that electricity markets are open to competition by 
outsiders. If we are searching for new and improved technologies to generate electricity from 
available primary energy sources, we should not be satisfied to leave this search just to the for-
mer monopolists. The dictum of Sir John Hicks according to which the nicest monopoly rent is a 
quiet life suggests that monopolists who are not threatened by competition are not likely to be 
very active innovators. In this context, one should recall the experience of the United States 
where the market opening provided by the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 
1978 induced a remarkable amount of entry by new firms with new techniques for electricity 
generation and showed that the incumbent monopolists had missed the train on technical pro-
gress. There may also be a risk that large incumbents, in particular, the former statutory monopo-
lists, may have a bias towards techniques which reinforce their market position, in political mar-
kets as well as electricity markets, i.e., techniques where minimum efficient scale is large so that 
they can claim that generation is a natural monopoly after all.  
Given the importance of searching for new and improved technologies for electricity generation 
and given the notion that this search should not just be left to the former monopolists, I infer that 
it is crucial to have a well functioning access regime for electricity grids. Past experience with 
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different approaches suggests that this calls for sector-specific regulation of access provision. 
The very same concern which makes for caution with respect to a sector-specific regulation of 
electricity prices thus also militates for the imposition of sector-specific regulation of grid access 
as a precondition for effective competition in electricity generation and sales.  
3.  How Should the Line Be Drawn Between the Regulated and  
Unregulated Parts of a Network Industry? 
3.1  Naïve versus Sophisticated Approaches  
Given the assessment that there are certain activities where competition policy is unlikely to be 
effective on an ongoing basis and where the benefits of sector-specific regulation, in particular, 
for enhancing competition in downstream markets, are deemed to outweigh the costs, the ques-
tion arises how large the domain of sector-specific regulation should be and how the relation of 
regulated and unregulated domains, of sector-specific regulation and competition policy are to be 
organized. In some sectors, this question has been approached somewhat naively. Thus, the 
European Electricity and Gas Directives provide for a sector-specific regulation of the networks, 
but not for a sector-specific regulation of production or trading of electricity and gas. Presuma-
bly, the distinction was based on the view that networks continue to be natural monopolies, and 
network access is a precondition for competition in downstream markets, but, once this precondi-
tion is met, competition will set off on its own. 
By contrast, the European Telecommunications Directives of 2002 introduce a more sophisti-
cated system for determining which activities are subject to sector-specific regulation and which 
ones are not. Activities are classified by “markets“. The basic principle is that sector-specific 
regulation should be imposed in those markets and only in those markets of the industry where 
workable competition does not exist and is unlikely to arise in the near future and that in all other 
markets the industry should be subject to general competition rules.  
To determine which markets are to be subjected to sector-specific regulation, the Telecommuni-
cations Directives specify a two-step procedure. In a first step, called “market definition”, the 
regulatory authority, following a recommendation from the European Commission, draws up a 
list of markets to be analysed. In a second step, called “market analysis”, the regulatory author-
ity, in consultation with the European Commission and with the other regulatory authorities in 
the EU, determines for each market on the list whether there is “effective competition” in this 
market. Effective competition is said to be present if and only if no firm in the market has “sig-
nificant market power”. The wording of the legal norms and of the Commission’s guidelines 
suggests that “significant market power” is similar to, but – in view of the different purposes of 
the different legal norms – not quite the same as “dominance” in Art. 82 EC.   
The sophisticated approach differs from the naïve approach in two respects. First, the division of 
the industry into the parts that are subject to sector-specific regulation and the parts that are sub-20 
ject to general competition policy is not fixed in the law, but is left to be decided by the authori-
ties in a well-specified procedure, presumably subject to judicial review. Second, the division of 
the industry into the parts that are subject to sector-specific regulation and the parts that are sub-
ject to general competition policy is based on considerations of competition and market power 
rather than the distinction between network infrastructures and downstream activities.  
This means, that, in principle, one can have downstream activities that are subject to sector-
specific regulation, and one can have network infrastructures that are partly or entirely not sub-
ject to sector-specific regulation. An example for the former is given by final consumer prices 
for basic fixed-line analogue or ISDN service. An example for the latter could be the markets for 
rentals of long-distance fixed lines at the highest level of the geographic network hierarchy in 
Germany where a significant number of alternative suppliers have built their own infrastructures 
and could in principle offer alternatives to the regulated offerings of Deutsche Telekom.
30  
I have serious doubts whether the sophisticated approach for determining which parts of the in-
dustry should be regulated is really superior to the naïve approach. In particular, I am not con-
vinced that the “market” is an appropriate unit of analysis for this question. Recognition of the 
difficulties that are involved in fact induces the practitioners to use the term “market” in a 
somewhat different sense from the way it is used in competition policy. I consider this differen-
tiation of legal terminology according to which legal norm is being applied to be problematic, 
the more so, since the Telecommunications Directives and national Telecommunications Laws 
themselves contain explicit references to origins of the terms in competition law.  In the follow-
ing, I will substantiate this criticism.  
3.2  Is the “Market” the Proper Unit of Reference? The Problem of “Cross-
Border” Systemic Effects 
The above discussion of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of sector-specific regula-
tion and competition policy named systemic interdependence of different activities as a major 
reason for failures of competition policy, the point being that competition policy intervention 
tends to be piecemeal and ad hoc, with little scope for embedding the analysis of the presumed 
abuse in a wider systemic context. Unfortunately, such concerns play no role on the sophisticated 
approach of the Telecommunications Directives. Under this approach, therefore, we must reckon 
with the possibility that, because of systemic interdependence,  different activities should be ana-
lysed jointly but are in fact in different domains, one in the domain of competition policy, the 
other in the domain of sector-specific regulation.  
As an example, consider the treatment of termination charges in mobile telephony. The European 
Commission has named network specific termination services as one of the set of markets to be 
analysed, much against the resistance of the industry and some national governments who would 
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have preferred termination services of all networks to be put in one “market”.  Given the defini-
tion of network specific markets for termination services, the outcome of “market analysis” is a 
foregone conclusion, for obviously, every network operator is dominant for access provision in 
his own network. The question then becomes what regulation the network operators will be sub-
jected to. The recurrence of complaints about termination charges suggests that some regulation 
of these charges might be called for.  
However, by what standard should regulated termination charges be set? The mobile network 
operators claim that they need high termination charges in order to finance their overall net-
works. The problem of attributing fixed and common costs here cuts across the boundary be-
tween regulated and unregulated activities. To assess the appropriateness of proposed termina-
tion charges, the regulator needs to have some notion of what is – or what should be – the contri-
butions of unregulated, competitive activities to covering fixed and common costs. However, 
how would he get the information that he would need to assess these contributions? Wouldn’t the 
very imposition of an information requirement for these activities contradict their status as being 
“unregulated”? 
In mobile telephony, markets for basic service and for the initiation of communications are, for 
the most part, highly competitive and have therefore not been subjected to sector-specific regula-
tion. Before the European Directives of 2002 were implemented, this unregulated regime was 
also applied to call terminations. Member State governments saw mobile telecommunications as 
a success story with which they did not want to interfere. The substantive reason given was that 
this sector was engaged in intense systems competition, which made it unnecessary to worry 
about each individual component of these systems.  
As a matter of economics, it is not clear that the systems competition argument carries very far. 
The person who calls the client of a mobile phone company does not generally profit from that 
particular company’s offerings himself. Moreover, if he urgently needs to reach that person, he 
has no way of substituting this company’s termination service by some other service. The com-
panies argue that their exploiting the market power which this structure gives them is actually 
welfare-enhancing because it corresponds to the Ramsey-Boiteux rule of having margins that are 
highest where demand elasticities are lowest, but in these arguments, they forget that the Ram-
sey-Boiteux rule applies to market demands, not the demands faced by any one company.
31 As 
an assessment of distortions induced by market power, the Commission’s judgment therefore 
seems to be correct.
32  
However, we should appreciate that there are many other markets in which firms have market 
power, which we do not subject to sector-specific regulation. Airlines have extraordinary market 
power on certain routes from or to airports where they hold rights to most of the slots. Even so, 
this is not deemed to be a reason for subjecting them to sector-specific regulation. Presumably, 
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the argument is that, if we wanted to imposed sector-specific regulation in every market in which 
a firm has and uses market power, then we should find ourselves with a bigger job than we han-
dle. There are just too many such markets and too many such firms. 
In the given example, the main objection is that, because of the systemic interdependence, it is 
impossible to do the regulatory job properly if terminations alone are subjected to it. One should 
subject either the entire spectrum of markets to it or none. Given the overall degree of satisfac-
tion with the performance of this industry, the former seems hardly appropriate. I therefore won-
der whether it would not be better to forego a sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommuni-
cations altogether. On the one hand, this means accepting monopoly pricing and ensuing distor-
tions for terminations; on the other hand it avoids getting into a mode where regulation is im-
posed, but cannot really be handled properly. 
The very same logic suggests that, perhaps, it is not so sensible to exempt the markets for rentals 
of fixed-line capacity at the highest level of the geographic network hierarchy from sector-
specific regulation. Here, too, the existence of significant common costs of different parts of the 
fixed-line network throws doubt on the workability of piecemeal exemptions. 
The overriding message of these remarks is not that we should have more regulation or less regu-
lation than the Telecommunications Directives are providing for. The message is, rather, that the 
imposition of sector-specific regulation should be conditioned on system effects, in particular, in 
relation to the networks, rather than market power. If we are willing to admit the existence and 
exploitation of market power in a standard competition policy regime for other industries, then, 
for network industries, the mere existence of market power in part of the industry is not a good 
reason for imposing regulation. If, instead, we are worried about systemic aspects of the indus-
try, e.g., with respect to cost attribution for services important for access provision, then we 
should focus on those systemic aspects, rather than market power. In this case, the mere absence 
of market power in a given market may not be a good reason for exempting the activity in ques-
tion from regulation. 
3.3  Is the “Market” the Proper Unit of Reference? The Problem of Market  
Definition 
Scepticism about the use of the market as the proper unit of reference is also warranted on pro-
cedural grounds. Experiences that we have had with the “old” Telecommunications Law in Ger-
many, in 1998 – 2004, provide a few lessons. Under the old Telecommunications Law, the impo-
sition of various kinds of sector-specific regulation was conditioned on the company’s being 
dominant in the sense of competition law. This is somewhat akin to the prevailing European 
framework condition regulation on the company’ being found to have significant market power. 
Under this regime, for example, Deutsche Telekom was subject to an ex ante regulation of final-
customer prices in those markets where it was held to be dominant.  23 
At some point, the company tried to use the dominance requirement as a lever to get out of regu-
lation. As one might expect, this gave rise to the usual game of what is the relevant market. 
However, in contrast to what we would expect from merger control cases, they went for narrow 
rather than wide definitions of relevant markets. Given the weight of incumbency, a wide defini-
tion would easily have supported a finding of dominance. However, they could make a case that 
such a finding was not justified for a suitably picked narrowly defined “market”. So they first 
applied for deregulation in the market for foreign calls from Germany to Turkey, from Germany 
to Denmark, and from Germany to the US. Subsequently, they proposed to look at the market for 
business calls between Frankfurt and Berlin and the market for foreign calls to Uzbekhistan.  
In dealing with these applications, the regulatory authority initially accepted Deutsche Tele-
kom’s market definitions and then, on the basis of further deregulated the phone calls to Turkey, 
but not to Denmark and the US. Subsequently, however, they rejected Deutsche Telekom’s mar-
ket definitions for business calls between Frankfurt and Berlin and for calls to Uzbekhistan. In 
the latter decision, they argued that any provider of telecommunications services to some foreign 
country was a potential provider of telecommunications services to any other foreign country as 
well, so on the basis of considering potential competition, all foreign calls should be treated as 
belonging to the same market. 
The regulatory authority’s first reaction to Deutsche Telekom’s applications reflected a straight-
forward application of the competition policy practice of market definition to the matter on hand. 
Their subsequent change of stance was motivated, first, by their coming to understand the diffi-
culties that the deregulation of excessively differentiated “markets” would pose for the viability 
of the system, and second, by their realizing that the need to go through these applications mar-
ket by market, doing a proper analysis of dominance for each “market”, would impose an enor-
mous administrative cost. 
These experiences are relevant for the handling of “market analysis” under the new European 
regime. To be sure, “market analyses” are preceded by the stage of “market definition”. How-
ever, the term “market definition” in telecommunications law does not mean the same thing as in 
general competition law. Whereas in general competition law, the term “market definition” re-
fers to the specification of the “market” that is relevant for demand, supply and pricing decisions 
of the various participants, the term “market definition” in telecommunications law is much 
broader. Thus, geographic aspects of market definition play no role in the recommendations of 
the European Commission; yet they are a key element in competition analysis. Moreover, the 
“markets” that the European Commission has recommended for “market definition” represent 
aggregates of market in the competition policy sense. For instance, in basic service, the Com-
mission’s Recommendation lumps analogue, ISDN and ISDN multiplex services all together 
under the category of “Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential 
customers”. Similarly, the German Regulatory Authority continues to follow its previous “anti-
Uzbekhistan” line and does not differentiate by geographic origin or destination. 24 
From a policy perspective, I consider this way of proceeding to be reasonable as a way of deal-
ing with the fact that, as explained in the preceding subsection, a decision about regulation mar-
ket by market in the competition policy sense of the term is unlikely to yield satisfactory results. 
Given the systemic concerns that underlie the use of sector-specific regulation in the first place, I 
am sceptical about narrow market definitions in this context. Apart from the administrative bur-
dens involved in doing separate analyses for lots of narrowly defined “markets”, I see the prob-
lem that the regulatory authority or the competition authority will find it hard to deal with cost 
attribution problems and cross-subsidization problems if regulation is conditioned on dominance 
in narrowly defined markets. If we decide to have calls to Uzbekhistan and calls to Denmark in 
different regimes when both types of calls require some of the same infrastructures, we may be 
undermining the viability of either regime. 
I also see an issue of stability of the regulatory environment if “yoyo” effects in narrowly de-
fined markets lead to repeated changes in the assessment of significant market power. Because of 
these concerns, the German Monopolies Commission, which initially had recommended apply-
ing the concept of market dominance in exactly the same way as under competition law, had 
subsequently recommended that the regulatory authority make extensive use of the “prognostic 
element” in its assessments of dominance and that it take account of relations to “neighbouring 
markets”.
33 
However, from a legal perspective, such recommendations are problematic. After all, the proce-
dures used in market analysis will be subject to court control. If the legal norms use competition 
law terminology, why should market participants – or the courts! – accept any use of this termi-
nology which deviates from traditional procedures? In this respect, the European framework is 
perhaps more flexible than the old German law; after all, relations to neighbouring markets are 
explicitly mentioned as a matter for consideration. Moreover, the Commission’s guidelines stress 
that “significant market power” is similar to, but in view of the different context, not quite the 
same as “market dominance”. Whatever the regulators and the courts are going to make of this, I 
feel uneasy on account of the fact that, at best, we are subject to significant legal uncertainty. At 
worst, we may end up with a dysfunctional scheme for determining the incidence of regulation.  
The broadness of “market definitions” recommended by the Commission and implemented by 
the national regulators should be seen as evidence that the “market” in the competition policy 
sense is not a natural unit of reference for determining the incidence of sector-specific regulation. 
It simply pays too little attention to systemic structures and their implications for the viability of 
competition policy. For legal hygiene, however, it would be better, if the legal norm was geared 
to the systemic effects, rather than the presence or absence of significant market power, and the 
procedure for “market definition” and “market analysis” did not involve any departure from 
standard competition policy procedures.  
                                        
33   Monopolkommission (2002), par. 140 – 159, in particular,  par. 153. 25 
From the experience of competition policy, we know that the precise definition of the market 
always involves a certain element of arbitrariness. If products are differentiated, the notion of 
relevant market itself is problematic because boundaries between sub-markets are hardly dis-
cernible. In competition policy, this arbitrariness of market definition makes for the livelihood of 
lawyers and economic experts, with some haphazardness of results. However, these cases typi-
cally involve a once-for-all decision. A merger is prohibited or allowed, an abuse of dominance 
is proscribed or not, and then, the case is closed. In contrast, in the telecommunications sector, 
market definitions are the basis for investigating significant market power, the finding of which 
is the basis for instituting an ongoing system of regulation. Here the arbitrariness of precise defi-
nitions and the haphazardness of legal outcomes poses a more serious problem. Criteria that 
yield haphazard outcomes are not a good basis for institutional arrangements that provide the 
requisite combination of continuity, legal certainty, and substantive appropriateness.  
3.4  Is the “Market” the Proper Unit of Reference? “Market Definition” as a 
 Political Act 
Given the preceding criticisms, the naïve approach practised in the energy sector begins to look 
better. If networks are subjected to regulation and downstream activities are not, one has a clear 
distinction along systemic lines, which may not be the same as a distinction according to market 
power. Something like this naive approach was in fact suggested by the German Monopolies 
Commission, which, under the “old” telecommunications law of 1996, had reported once every 
two years on the development of competition in telecommunications and to make recommenda-
tions on whether to change the list of markets in the law. The Monopolies Commission recom-
mended considering functionally separate groups of relatively homogenous markets with a view 
to deregulating all or none of them, regardless of concerns about dominance. Thus in 2003 and 
2005, it recommended taking all long-distance and foreign voice telecommunications out of the 
domain of sector-specific regulation even though in some of markets that were involved, 
Deutsche Telekom still held a clearly dominant position. Neglect of such dominance was justi-
fied by the observation that many markets with dominant firms are subject to competition policy 
without any idea for sector-specific regulation, i.e. that dominance cannot be the appropriate dis-
tinguishing criterion.  
Such assessments are at bottom political in nature. The Monopolies Commission’s recommenda-
tions under the old telecommunications law in fact were addressed to the German Parliament, as 
recommendations to change the law. I believe that the step of “market definition” under the 
European Telecommunications Directives is similarly political in nature. The Directives and na-
tional laws merely dress it up as an administrative act which implements the law and which is 
itself subject to judicial review.  
To be sure, the legal norms list substantive criteria for the inclusion of a market in the list that is 
drawn up under the heading of “market definition”. However, these criteria are soft and do not 
lend themselves to judicial review. More importantly, these criteria cannot be seriously applied 26 
unless one has already done the market analysis, which, however, only comes afterwards. The 
list of markets drawn up under the heading of market definition should include those markets 
which exhibit significant and durable structural of legal barriers to entry, which do not exhibit a 
tendency towards a development of effective competition, even in the long run, and for which 
competition policy is insufficient to counteract the market failures that result from market power. 
I fail to see how these criteria can be reliably assessed when the market analysis has not yet been 
done. Moreover, the third criterion, whether competition policy is deemed to be able to counter-
act market failures or not, involves subjective judgment and is hardly compatible with a serious 
judicial review of administrative decisions. 
I would prefer it if the political nature of the first step of the procedure was made more explicit, 
perhaps under a different name, without any pretense that this is comparable to what competition 
economists understand by “market definition”. I would also prefer it if the detailed analysis of 
the second step paid more attention to the systemic aspects of the problem because these aspects 
are central to the distinction between the two policy modes. Bringing in such concerns at a later 
stage, by reinterpreting the terms that are used in the legal norms to make them fit the problem 
seems inappropriate. Such reinterpretations of terms may provide a pragmatic way to deal with 
the inappropriateness of the approach. However, it undermines the status of competition policy 
and sector-specific regulation as being carried out under a rule of law. It also reduces transpar-
ency and immunizes the authorities from political and judicial control. It is perhaps not a coinci-
dence that, in the implementation of the European Telecommunications Directives, there have 
been hardly any instances of deregulation. In what was ostensibly introduced as a system for or-
ganizing the transition from sector-specific regulation to competition policy wherever possible, 
we have mainly seen the imposition of additional sector-specific regulation.  
4.   On the Co-Existence of Competition Policy and Sector-Specific 
Regulation  
In this final section of the paper, I will discuss some issues that arise from the simultaneous ap-
plication of competition policy and sector-specific regulation in the same industry. As discussed 
in the introduction, there are several dimensions to this simultaneity, substantive, legal, institu-
tional. I first consider some substantive issues and will then move on to a discussion of legal and 
institutional arrangements.  
4.1 Substantive  Issues 
Two sets of substantive issues arise. The first set involves issues that arise because competition 
policy and sector-specific regulation rely on legal norms that use the same terminology. The sec-
ond set involves issues that arise because competition policy and sector-specific regulation are 
applied to the same industries. 27 
When legal norms for competition policy and sector-specific regulation involve the same termi-
nology, the challenge is to preserve the viability of this terminology as a basis for administrative 
and legal practice. There is a tension here between, on the one hand, the need for legal precision 
and, on the other hand, the need for appropriateness in different applications. The former calls 
for inflexibility, the latter for flexibility in one’s use of the terms. The above discussion of the 
use of the term “market” in current telecommunications provides a case in point. Although I ap-
plaud the pragmatism with which the matter has been approached, I am uneasy about the fact 
that, because of the difference in purposes, we now have different uses of this term in the appli-
cation of telecommunications law and in the application of competition law.  
Other examples concern the standards and procedures that authorities and courts use in practice 
to fill the legal terms with content. An example is given by cost standards that are used to assess 
prices. For instance, in its discussions with electricity producers, the Federal Cartel Office in 
Germany has pointed to the fact that existing power plants have been built a long time ago and 
have long been written off. Therefore, the Federal Cartel Office argues, capital costs for these 
power plants should not play a role in assessing current electricity prices. Implicitly, this argu-
ment takes historically realized costs as the appropriate standard for assessing prices. By con-
trast, legal norms guiding sector-specific regulation tend to impose standards that involve for-
ward-looking, long-run incremental costs, sometimes with a proviso that cost is to be assessed on 
the basis of the most efficient technology available. Given the well-known incentive effects of 
cost-plus pricing rules, I consider the latter standard to be more appropriate. More importantly, I 
consider the difference between these standards to be problematic. For an integrated electricity 
company, such differences can provide room for regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, in a dynamic 
setting, where activities are moved from one domain to the other as the need for sector-specific 
regulation decreases, such differences mean that, when this move occurs, not only the institu-
tional arrangements, but also the substantive standards for statutory oversight are changed.  
Differences can also arise in the assessment of defenses that the companies give for certain prac-
tices. An example is provided by the German Regulatory Authority’s assessment of Deutsche 
Telekom’s pricing of DSL connections in 2000. The text of decision explains at length why the 
authority considers the price that Deutsche Telekom charged for DSL connections to be preda-
tory. Then, at the very end, the authority explains that it is not going to proscribe Deutsche Tele-
kom’s pricing policy after all because cheap pricing for fast internet connections is going to 
promote the declared policy objective of the German government of enhancing the use of the 
internet in German society. With this reasoning, the Regulatory Authority departed from the le-
gal tradition of German competition law which had long held that substantive defenses for pre-
sumed abuses had to be based on the objective of the very law that was involved, i.e. the Law 
Against Restraint of Competition and that an appeal to any arbitrarily chosen objective of public 
policy was not compatible with the requirements of a stable rule of law in competition policy. 
Leaving aside the question whether Deutsche Telekom’s pricing in the particular case was in-
deed predatory, I consider it problematic if sector-specific regulation has different standards in 28 
assessing the abusiveness of a disputed practice when the legal norm actually uses the same 
terms as the Law Against Restraint of Competition.  
Whereas these examples raise questions of consistency in the application of competition policy 
concepts in different legal norms and across different industries, a second set of issues raise 
questions of consistency in the treatment of a given industry. If a network industry is subject to 
sector-specific regulation and competition policy at the same time, one needs to have some 
mechanism to ensure that the different regimes do not work at cross-purposes. Thus, if there are 
common costs that concern activities in the domain of sector-specific regulation as well as activi-
ties in the domain of competition policy, standards and procedures for dealing with them should 
be consistent. If there is an interdependence between, say the definition of the relevant markets 
in the assessment of a merger of electricity producers and the viability of the regulatory regime 
for grid access, this interdependence should be taken into account (as was not sufficiently done 
in the VEBA-VIAG (E.ON) and RWE-VEW merger approvals in 2000).  
In thinking about these different issues, we see that they involve two different notions of policy 
coherence. On the one hand, we want competition policy to be coherent across sectors. Competi-
tion policy gains its legitimacy from the fact that it applies the same rules to all industries and all 
market participants. Discrimination would undermine this legitimacy. On the other hand, we also 
want a certain consistency of statutory policy towards a given industry. Moreover, the policy 
should be appropriate for the industry in question. In the case of a network industry which, after 
all, has specific features which are the reason for subjecting this industry to sector-specific regu-
lation, we wouldn’t want, e.g., abuse-of-dominance proceedings under competition policy to be 
at odds with what the sector regulator is doing in his domain. As yet, we have little understand-
ing of how to resolve the conflict between these two notions of policy coherence.  
4.2 Institutional  Issues 
Policy coherence is to some extent a matter of institutional arrangements. However, the tension 
between the two notions of coherence poses a major challenge for institution design. The chal-
lenge is all the greater because the different authorities are subject to different kinds of influ-
ences. Experience seems to show that sector-specific regulation is rather more susceptible to 
regulatory capture than competition policy. In some instances where sector-specific regulators 
have departed from traditions of competition policy in the application of competition policy 
norms, it seems clear that pressure from the political system has played a significant role. The 
difference reflects the fact that companies under sector-specific regulation, unlike companies 
under competition policy, have a strong and persistent interest in lobbying the political authori-
ties as well as the regulators. The fact that Member State governments continue to hold signifi-
cant shares in some of the former monopolists has also played a role.   
At a very basic level, one would like to ensure that the different institutions co-operate where 
such co-operation is needed. As far as I can tell, legal norms already provide for such co-29 
operation, at least in the form of statutory consultation on decisions of mutual interest. Rules for 
mutual access to relevant information seem rather weaker and should probably be strengthened.  
However, when there are separate authorities, or even just separate units within a given author-
ity, exchanges of information and views will not be sufficient for policy coherence. One possibil-
ity to go further might be to follow an example set by banking supervision in Germany: The su-
pervisers are employees of the Bundesbank working on behalf of (and under orders from) the 
supervisory authority. By this device, the Bundesbank has the information it needs for its role in 
monetary policy, in particular, the soft information which is not contained in published numbers, 
and yet there is a separation of responsibilities. A similar arrangement, with employees of the 
regulator applying competition law on behalf of the competition authority might improve the 
coherence of competition policy across sectors while ensuring that the regulator has the informa-
tion about the unregulated part of the industry that he needs.. 
Whereas the discussion so far, has focussed on concerns that arise when different parts of the 
same industry, with well-defined boundaries, are subject to different policy regimes, existing 
arrangements in the European Union also raise concerns about the possibility that the very same 
activities might be subject to both regimes simultaneously. As mentioned in the introduction, 
European competition law, in particular, Articles 81 and 82 EC, cannot be overruled by national 
law. The legal norms that provide the basis for sector-specific regulation are based on European 
Directives, but are strictly speaking national laws and can therefore not pre-empt the application 
of European competition law, although they can – and in the case of Germany do – pre-empt the 
application of national competition law. Thus, in the cases of Deutsche Telekom and, more re-
cently, Telefonica, the Commission has relied on Article 82 EC to condemn pricing policies that 
had previously been approved by the national regulators. The Commission’s decision in the case 
of Deutsche Telekom has by now been confirmed by the Court of First Instance. In the case 
Konsolidierer/Deutsche Post, the Federal Cartel Office, acting under the auspices of Regulation 
01/2003, used Article 82 EC to force the company to grant access to competitors where the regu-
lator had failed to act.
 34 
In these cases, the simultaneous applicability of European competition law and national regula-
tory law has led to healthy rivalry of authorities, which has helped to counteract the effects of 
regulatory capture at the national level. This rivalry of authorities worked the way it did because, 
under existing case law, the Treaty, and therefore European competition law as part of the 
Treaty, is directly applicable in the Member States of the European Union. In each case, actually, 
the competition authorities held that they were not contravening any explicit mandates of the 
regulatory authorities, but merely objecting to the companies’ uses of the leeway left to them by 
the regulatory authorities, e.g. the leeway for setting individual prices under a price-cap regime. 
                                        
34   The extent to which national regulatory law actually pre-empts the application of competition law is a matter 
of dispute. In Germany, most scholars hold that, as a lex specialis, the law establishing sector-specific regula-
tion pre-empts the Law against Restraint of Competition, see, e.g. Möschel (1999, 2001). However, in assess-
ing the Federal Cartel Office’s injunction against Deutsche Post in 2005, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal 
suggested that. Even without appealing to European law, there might be a dual authority of the two laws and 
the two institutions. 30 
If, in the Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica cases, the prices in question had actually been man-
dated by the regulators, the Commission would have had to initiate Treaty violation proceedings 
against the Member States in question, which probably would have taken much more time and 
would therefore have been less effective.  
From the perspective of the companies that are concerned, the co-existence of different legal re-
gimes is a source of legal uncertainty and of costs. It would, in principle, be desirable to have a 
more streamlined system.
35 Given the relative standing of European law and national law, how-
ever, such a system would seem to presume a European competence for sector-specific regula-
tion. Even then, there would be a question of how to mark the boundaries between the two re-
gimes.  
A discussion of policy coherence in sector-specific regulation and competition policy would not 
be complete without a mention of the courts. Given that some of the legal norms in sector-
specific regulation and competition law are ostensibly the same, I consider it important that judi-
cial review should, at least ultimately, rest with the same courts, and that these courts should be 
aware of the underlying unity of the legal norms. In the case of antitrust law, ultimate authority 
rests with the European Court of Justice. The decentralization of European antitrust enforcement 
under Regulation 01/2003 involves a risk that the practices of national competition authorities 
and national courts may diverge, but then, this divergence can be eliminated by the European 
Commission taking over important case or by the national courts asking for guidance from the 
European Court of Justice.  
By contrast, in the area of sector-specific regulation, the role of the European Court of Justice is 
weaker because the law that is being applied is national, subject to European Directives. The ul-
timate arbiters of this law are the highest courts of the different Member States. There is thus a 
danger that the underlying unity of certain legal norms may be lost as the highest courts of the 
different Member States may interpret these norms differently, or as their interpretation in cases 
involving sector-specific regulation under national law may diverge from their interpretation by 
the European Court of Justice in cases involving competition policy under European law. In the 
interest of the unity of the law, it is to be hoped that, in matters of legal norms that are common 
to both areas, the authority of the European Court of Justice as the ultimate source of jurisdiction 
on competition law will be extended to the law of sector-specific regulation.  
                                        
35   This concern seems to be a reason why, in the United States, the Supreme Court, in Crédit Suisse  even more 
than in Trinko, went rather far in asserting that sector-specific regulation pre-empts the application of anti-
trust law. One may wonder whether the Supreme Court’s stance in Crédit Suisse isn’t apt to leave some as-
pects of firm behaviour out of the domains of both, antitrust law and regulation, the latter because the legal 
norms underlying the sector-specific regulation do not provide enough of a basis for intervention, the former, 
because the existence of sector-specific regulation is deemed to pre-empt the application of antitrust law. 
Would something like the antitrust prosecution of exclusionary in the AT&T case in the seventies still be 
possible after Crédit Suisse? 31 
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